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ABSTRACT
We extend the notion of Coalition Proof Nash Equilibriujn to a class of
matching games with private information. This solution concept is applied to
an adverse selection insurance economy, and is shown to yield a unique
allocation: the separating allocation without cross - subsidy . The relation to
alternative approaches to modelling contracting games with private
information, such as the Incentive Compatible Core, is discussed.^
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper extends the notion of Coalition Proof Equilibrium (CPE) to a
class of games where players possess payoff - relevant private information.
Our extension can either be regarded as a generalization from the complete
information context of the original recursive formulation of Berhneim, Peleg,
Whinston (1987) or an extension of the stable set characterization used by
Greenberg (1989) and Kahn-Mookherj ee (1990). In the imperfect information
context, it is necessary to redefine the notion of "blocking" of one
coalitional agreement by another. The main difference is that blocking
deviations are required to be "credible"
,
in the sense that members of a
coalition must signal their private information credibly to one another.
We apply the solution concept to a contracting game in the simple
adverse selection insurance economy analyzed by Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976),
Wilson (1977) and many others since. Our approach stands in contrast to purely
noncooperative or cooperative approaches pursued in previous literature. In
purely noncooperative approaches outcomes are very sensitive to the precise
specification of the sequence of moves in the game (see. for instance Hellwig
(1987) and Kreps ri990),). Thev have been criticized by some authors (e.g.,
Zcyd, Prescctt and Smith ^1988)} for imposing a given "organizational
structure", interpreted as a particular extensive form that tend to rule out
certain forms of communication and coordination among private agents. The
latter criticism is particularly pertinent to the welfare implications that
one may derive from such models.
These observations have motivated the study of cooperative
approaches, where coalitions of economic agents may be interpreted as forms of
non-market organizations. Nevertheless, the presence of private information
imposes certain incentive compatibility restrictions on allocations that are
feasible for any given coalition. These restrictions presume a noncooperat ive
element that is also essential, so that the resulting theory needs to blend
cooperative and noncooperative elements judiciously.
Our theory may be viewed as belonging to this genre. There are two main
differences from previous literature. Most of the existing literature extends
2
the notion of the Core to an Incentive Compatible (IC) Core, where feasible
allocations for a coalition must satisfy individual incenc ive compac ibilicy
restrictions, requiring that a proposed allocation should be immune to further
deviations by singleton subcoalitions . Consequently equilibrium allocations
have to satisfy a far more stringent requirement than alternative blocking
proposals: the former have to be immune to deviations by all subcoalitions,
whereas the latter must be immune to deviations only by singleton
subcoalitions. In contrast, the approach we develop requires any blocking
proposal to satisfy coalition incentive compac ibilicy constraints, not just
individual ones. These constraints apply in a consistent fashion to
equilibrium allocations as well as proposed blocking deviations.
The second major difference concerns the notion of blocking. This imolies
different underlying assumptions regarding the process d" wnicr. coalitions
form, and the nature of monitoring and trading within an;/ «_wcal i. l j-wu . wc assume
that it is possible for a subcoalition to deviate away from an ongoing
coalitional arrangement, without other members being aware of this deviation.
Consequently, remaining members of the coalition cannot reorganize their
trades or contracts in light of the deviation. In other words, contracting is
decentralized in the sense that agreements between members of any given
(sub)coalition cannot be monitored by those not belonging to it. In contrast.
the IC Core approach assumes chat any deviating proposal is publicly
observable, and that those not included in the deviating coalition can thereby
reorganize their actions in light of the deviation.
As will become apparent in the application to the insurance economy, this
assumption has important implications for the nature of equilibrium outcomes.
If deviations are "private," then this destroys the viability of
cross -subsidized contracts (since new contracts can be designed to attract
away the profitable customers). If deviations are not private, then the
original firm offering cross - subsidized contracts would be able to react in a
way that may destroy the viability of the deviating contracts. Consequently,
cross- subsidized contracts are viable when deviations are "public," not
otherwise. The dependence of equilibrium outcomes on the ability of incumbent
firms to react to new contracts has already been noted in the literature on
noncooperative models of the insurance market. For instance, the different
notions used by Rothschild-Stiglitz (Nash Equilibrium), Wilson (Anticipatory
Equilibrium) and Riley (1979) (Reactive Equilibrium) correspond to different
implicit assumptions regarding the ability of incumbent firms to react, or
anticipate reactions of others. In many ways, the solution we obtain resembles
3
the Riley notion of Reactive Equilibrium.
It follows that "cooperative" approaches to modelling private information
economies are also affected by the difficulty previously ascribed tc
noncooperative formulations: equilibrium outcomes can depend rather
sensitively on the exact process by which contract proposals are made and
reacted to. Nonetheless there does appear to be an advantage in the
cooperative formulations that the dependency is tied to underlying notions of
observability of actions rather than to details of timing in an artificially
imposed set of rules. In our context, the welfare properties of equilibria
may depend on these aspects of the institutional process in an intrinsic
manner, rather than on ad hoc restrictions on the set of coalitions that are
4
allowed to form.
Section II provides the extension of CPE to a general class of games with
private information. Section III applies this solution concept to the simple
insurance economy. Section IV concludes by discussing some implications of the
analysis for the possible role of governments in enhancing welfare.
II. THE SOLUTION CONCEPT.
Let P denote the set of players. Players differ from one another in a
number of characteristics, some of which are publicly observable, while others
are known privately to the player concerned. Let T denote the set of types of
individuals, assumed finite. Types are partitioned into categories \ two
types which belong to the same category are publicly indistinguishable. In
other words, everyone in the economy can identify a person's category, but
only he himself knows his own type. Let N denote the set of categories. Let
T. denote the set of all possible types in category i. Any player in category
i has available to him the set of actions A..
The underlying game is played by a set of players which is constructed
bv selecting one member from each category The selection of the set of
players is made by a random matching process. Suppose that the matching
process has brought together a group of players from different categories,
where the category i player happens to be of type t.. Let t = (t..,t^,..)
denote the resulting vector of types in this player group. If in this
particular play of the game the set of chosen actions is a - (a.. , a^ , . . . ) , then
the player of category i obtains a von Neumann Morgenstern payoff U(a|t).
Notice chac the payoff depends not only on the actions of other players but
also of their types. The crucial limitation to this selection device is that
a player's payoff is independent of the actions chosen by other players in the
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same category.
For simplicity, we assume throughout the analysis that all players of a
given type behave identically, both in choice of action and in decisions about
joining a coalition. Effectively, this simplification is a restriction to
pure strategies. With this assumption, we can henceforth think of a player as
a representative member of any given type. A strategy for category i is
therefore a function s.:T. -> A..11 1
There are two interpretations of the matching process. Either it is a
one-time selection, where the underlying game is played just once by the
selected group, or it is a repeated selection, in which case each player is
assumed to make the same play in all encounters. Under the first
interpretation of the matching process, let q.(t .|t.) represent the
probability assessment made by a player of type t. that he will be grouped
with a set of players from other categories whose types happen to be
represented by the vector t .. (Under the second interpretation, it represents
the relative frequency that type t. is matched with a set with type vector t .
when groups are selected to play the game repeatedly.) We define the ex ante
utility of a olaver of tvpe t. as a function of the vector s . of strategies
-
• 1 -
1
°
selected by players in other categories, and the action a. chosen by this
type
:
W.(s_..a.|t ) = I q (t It.) U.(s_.(t_.),a.|t_..t.) (2.1)
t .e T
-
1
In effect we have reformulated the game of incomplete information as a
Bayesian game.- This enables us co define a strategy vector s = (s s ..) to
be a (Bayesian) Nash Equilibrium if for all i e N and all t.e T.:
s.(t.) € argmax U.(s.,a.t.) (2.2)11 ^ ^ 1 - 1 1 ' 1 ^
a . e A.
1 1
In what follows, we will use the repeated encounter interpretation of the
matching technology, so that there are a large number of players of the
different types and the matching represents a repetition of independent draws.
It is for this particular interpretation that the following description of the
preplay communication process is most apt. It is also the natural
interpretation for application to the insurance market game in the following
section, where different insurance firms and the set of insurance customers
constitute the different categories of players, and there are a large number
of players in the customer category (divided into different risk types).
Before play begins, different coalitions may form in order to coordinate
on their strategy choices. A coalicion is a subset of the set of all players
P, with the restriction that if a player of a given type is a member of that
coalition, then so are all other players of the same type. This restriction
ensures that a coalition is simply a subser -^ f 7 . = .3 a co^.ec lion of
types, typically from different categories '•:: course, ii is not possible for
any member of a coalition to verify the types of other members. We shall
describe below how members of a coalition can infer the types of other
members: specifically, we shall impose a credibility constraint on any
agreement that a coalition may seek to enter into, where members signal their
types to each other by their willingness to be party to the agreement.
An agreement (or contract:) is a combination of a coalition C and a
strategy vector s - (s.. , s^ , . . . ) . It may be interpreted as an agreement among
members of C to coordinate on the choice of actions as stipulated by s, given
their common expectation that non-members are choosing actions as stipulated
by s .
An agreement (C.s) is said to undermine the agreement (D,v) (denoted
(C.s) > (D.v)) if:
(1) C c D
(ii) s.(t.) *« v.(t.) for all t.
€
C
(iii) All members of C have higher ex ante payoffs at s than at v:
W.(s|t.) > W.(v|t.) for all t. G C.11 1 ' 1 1
(iv) The agreement (C,s) is a credible deviation from the strategy vector v,
i.e. for any t. e C, any other type t. G T. does not belong to C if and only
if
A A
sup W.(v .,a.|t.) > sup W.(s.,a.|t.) (2.3)
.
1-111 ^
^ 1-111
a.e A. a.€ A.11 11
The first condition requires the deviating coalition to be a proper
o
subset of the- original coalition. In particular this implies that an
agreement cannot be undermined by a group of individuals some of whom are not
party to this agreement. This is consistent with the spirit of all agreemenr.-
(not involving the grand coalition P) constituting private deviations. ^:.^::
those outside the coalition are not aware of the deviation taking place. For
instance, if D is a proper subset of P, then those not in D would not be aware
that members of D were intending to play as in v. In such cases they could not
possibly be involved in engineering a further deviation that would undermine
(D,v).
The second and third conditions are self evident: the second requires
that only members of the deviating coalition change their action choices,
while they expect nonmembers to continue to choose actions as in the original
agreement, (iii) requires the deviants to be better off in expectation.
The fourth condition deserves some explanation. Note that members of a
given coalition cannot verify each others' types. Nevertheless, the
profitability of the deviation for any member will in general depend on the
types of his partners. Consequently, members will be concerned to assure
themselves that their partners are really of the types that they claim to
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be. Condition (iv) is a natural condition that ensures that the types of
different members are credibly signalled to one another. It says that if there
is a player from a certain category i in the coalition who claims to be of
type t. , then this player can convince others that he is not of a type t. that
A
is not represented in the coalition. For if he were of this alternate type t.,
then the highest expected utility that he could possibly get following the
deviation is given by the right hand side of (2.3). This does not exceed what
such a type would be getting in the status quo (the left hand side of (2.3)).
In other words, such a type could not conceivably benefit from the deviation,
and therefore could not provide support to it. In contrast, all types
ostensibly included in the deviation do strictly benefit from it (as ensured
by condition (iii)). Our criterion therefore bears a close relation to the
Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps (1987) for refining sequential equilibria
of noncooperative extensive form games.
At issue in any game is the question of which agreements will be viable.
For an agreement (C,s) to be viable, it should not be undermined by a
deviating agreement involving a subcoalition of C. Invoking the principle of
consistency , we require deviating agreements themselves to be inviolate
against deviations by subgroups of the initial subcoalition. This leads to
the following recursive definition of a self - enforcing agreement
:
If Che set C contains a single type, then for any strategy
vector s, the agreement (C.s) is self - enforc ing
.
If the set C contains more than one type, the agreement (C,s) is
self - enforcing if for no proper subset D of C is it the case that there is a
self -enforcing agreement (D,v) which undermines (C,s).
A self -enforcing agreement is therefore the natural formulation of
coalicion incencive compacibilicy: If (C,s) is self -enforcing, then there
does not exist a subcoalition that can profit from a self -enforcing deviation.
The following, more concise definition makes use of the von-Neumann
Morgenstern concept of an abstract stable set:
A stable set of agreements is a set G such that
(C,s) € G <=> there does not exist (D.v) e. G such that (D,v) > (C,s).
In the example we investigate in Che next section a unique stable set of
agreements exists, namely the see of self -enforcing agreements.
Either definicion of self enforcing agreemencs can be used to generate
our equilibrium concept:
A strategy vector s is said to be a Coalition Proof Equilibrium with Private
Information (CPEPI) if:
(i) the agreement (P,s) is self enforcing, and
(ii) there does not exist any other self enforcing agreement (P,v) which
Pareto-dominates (P,s).
10
It can be shown that this definition reduces to BPW's Coalition
Proof Equilibrium in the absence of private information provided that the set
of players is finite and the set of actions for each player is finite. It can
12
also be verified that a CPEPI is always a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Ill APPLICATION TO THE INSURANCE ECONOMY
We first describe the economy, and later explain how we cast it in terms
of the game theoretic model of the previous section. There are two kinds of
economic agents: insurance customers and insurance firms. Each customer
belongs to one of two risk classes: high (H) or low (L) . Each customer knows
his own risk class, but no firm can identify the risk class of any specific
customer. There are a large number of customers, and a fraction n. > of the
customer population is commonly known to be of risk class i (i = H,L), where
^H ^ ^L
-^-
For each customer, there are two states of nature: accident (A) and no
accident (NA) . In the accident state the customer suffers a loss of endowment.
There is a single physical commoditv cne endowment loss is d units of this
connnodity. There are therefore .t'-."? contingent commodities for every ccnsumei",
corresponding to delivery in the two states of nature, and the commodity space
2
can be identified with IR . Letting the first commodity correspond to delivery
in the no accident state, the endowment of every customer is (0,-d), where
d > 0.
All customers share the common von Neumann Morgenstern utility function
U:IR -^ R which is continuously dif ferentiable and strictly concave (so every
11
customer is risk averse). Use p. co denote the probability of the accident
state for risk class i, where 1 > p > p > 0. So either state could arise for
H L
either type of customers, but the likelihood of the accident state is higher
for the high risk types. If the type i customer enters into a net trade of
(x^,x^) his expected utility will therefore be
U.(Xq,x^) - p. U(x^ - d) + (1 - p.) U(Xq) (3.1)
There are a number of risk neutral insurance firms, denoted f
13 f f1,2,3,..F. If firm f provides a net trade vector (x-^,x ) to a customer of
risk type i, it will obtain an expected profit of
f f f f
tt^CXq.x^) = -p^x^ - (1 - P^)Xq (3.2)
-^—«===. INSERT FIGURE 1 =================
Figure 1 represents indifference curves of the two types of customers, as
well as isoprofit curves for firms. The origin depicts the initial endowment
point; the line ABC is the locus of points of full insurance. Line OCD is the
locus of net trade vectors that would generate zero profits ror suppivine
firms when offered to high risk customers, and OAF is the ccrrcspondir.g lir.e
for low risk customers. Indifference curves for high risk customers are
flatter than for low risk customers, and are tangent to corresponding
isoprofit lines along the line of full insurance.
The complete information Walrasian outcome is for a customer of each risk
type to obtain full insurance at actuarially fair odds, i.e. so H types would
receive C and L- types A. In the absence of information about risk type, this
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allocation would fail to be incentive compatible: high risk customers would
masquerade as low risk in order to avail of the trade A rather than C.
A separating allocacion without cross- subsidy is a trade allocation in
which the high risk customers obtain full insurance at actuarially fair odds
(i.e. the point C in Figure 1), and low risk customers obtain incomplete
insurance, also at actuarially fair odds, at the point (D in Figure 1) where
the high risk customers are indifferent between the two trade vectors. These
trade vectors are hereafter denoted x and x respectively.
H L
We now describe the trading game for this economy, in terms of the
general class of games considered in the previous section. The set of
categories is N - ( , 1 , 2 , 3 , . . F} . Players of category are insurance
customers, while category i > 1 corresponds to firm i. Thus, there are a large
number of players in category 0, but a single player in category i > 1.
Players in category belong to two risk types, so T- - {H,L). On the other
hand, there is perfect information regarding firms, so for i > 1, T. contains
a single element. Moreover, the matching process is represented by
'^i^^il^)
if tQ = H
= L
lor any i ^ i.
Customers formulate trade requests, while firms make trade offers. Trade
occurs when request and offer match. Player f > 1 has the action set
f f 2
A^ " { S
I
S^ IR
so firm f selects a set S of trade offers
13
The consumer chooses his action (f*,r) from the set of trade requests:
Aq = {1.2. ..F) X R
* 14
in other words, the customer selects a firm f and makes a request r. A
trade takes place only if the consumer requests it and the firm offers it:
* f
if f = f and r e S
otherwise
Consequently the payoff of type j of player is
"o<^0'^r^2'-l VJ' " Pj"'^ x^ - d) + (1 p,)U(J: x;;)
J J
0-
and for player f > 1 is
U^(aQ.a^.a2
.-IV^
We use V.(x), j = H.L to denote the expected utility obtained bv a.
customer from the net trade vector x.
PROPOSITION There is a unique CPEPI outcome which is che
separating allocation without cross subsidy.
Proof : It suffices to establish that the strategy vector s with the property
that (P,s) is self enforcing, are strategy vectors which yield separating
14
allocations without cross - subsidy
.
STEP 1 : There exists a self enforcing agreement ( P . s ) resulting in the
separating allocation without cross subsidy
.
Consider the following strategies: H types of the customer request x
H
from firm 1, L types request x from firm 1, firm 1 offers S = (x x ), while
L H L
firms f > 2 offer nothing. We claim that this is self -enforcing . It is evident
that every single player is playing a best response, so (P,s) cannot be
undermined by any singleton coalition. Moreover, the only coalitions that can
conceivably undermine (P,s) must include some firms, and one or both types of
the customer.
Suppose there exists a coalition involving some firm and only the H type
of the customer, which can deviate to a self -enforcing agreement which
undermines (P,s). Then H types must obtain a higher expected utility than at
X
,
and must therefore be able to secure a trade vector which generates losses
for whichever firm offers it. Since L types do not form part of the coalition,
they must continue to request the trade x from Firm 1. So the new trade
obtained by the H types following the deviation is obtained only by the H
types. The deviating agreement cannot be self -enforcing, then, because it can
be undermined in turn bv a further deviation where the firm offering the new
trade to the H types drops "his offer and avoids the resulting losses.
Suppose (P.s) is undermined by a coalition involving some firm(s) and
only L types of the customer. In order for this deviation to be credible, it
must be the case that the H types do not prefer the new trade obtained by the
L types. This implies that the new trade obtained by the L types must lie in
the shaded region of Figure 1. Such a trade would generate losses for the
firms selling it, and (using an argument analogous to that in the previous
15
paragraph) the deviating agreement cannot therefore be a sel f - enforc ing
.
Suppose (P.s) is undermined by an agreement involving a coalition
involving both types of customers, and some firms. Then both types of
customers must be better off in the agreement. Consequently the trade obtained
by the H type must lose money for whichever firm offers it. If this trade
differs from the trade obtained by the L type, then it is clear that the
agreement cannot be self -enforcing since the firm offering the trade to the H
type will be better off dropping the offer. Hence the deviation must involve a
pooled trade, at a point like Q in Figure 2. Moreover, the deviation must
involve a single firm (since all parties to the deviation must be strictly
better off, and all types of the customer trade with a single firm)
.
We claim that the deviating agreement is not self -enforcing . It is
evident chat the trade Q loses money on the H types, and earns profits on the
L types. Moreover, the marginal rates of substitution of the two types
necessarily differ at Q. We claim that the deviating agreement is undermined
by the following self -enforcing agreement between the same firm and the L
types: the firm withdraws its offer of 0, and offers inszeaa ::ne trade R
(close to Q) , where V. (R) > V, (Q) and V„(R) < V (Q) . Ac the same time chc LL L H rl
types request the trade R from this firm. It is evident that the deviating
agreement is credible, and undermines the original deviation. Moreover, both
the concerned firm and the L types are playing best responses, so the
deviating agreement is self -enforcing. Hence the original deviation cannot be,
concluding the proof of Step 1.
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STEP 2 : There cannot be a self enfore inR agreement: ( P . v ) where H types
get lower expected ut 11 i tv than at the separating allocation without
cross - subsidy
.
Suppose this is false. Then there exists a point of full insurance (such
as G in Figure 2) close to C - x which earns positive expected profit for
H
both types of customers, and which generates higher expected utility for the H
types. If the L types are at least as well off in v as at the trade G, a
coalition of an inactive firm (i.e. a firm that does not trade with either
type of customer in v) and the H types could form an agreement to deviate to a
trade of G. It is evident that this agreement is credible, self -enforcing and
undermines (P,v).
So consider the case that L types are better off at G than they are in v.
Then a coalition containing an inactive firm, and both types of customers,
could agree to deviate by trading G (i.e. the firm would offer G and both
types would request G from the firm) . We claim that the deviating agreement is
self -enforcing. No singleton subcoalition could profitably deviate. Moreover,
a coalition of the firm and the H type alone would not be able to find a
self -enforcing agreement to undermine the deviation. Since the deviation does
not involve the L type, it must be the case that the L type continues to
request G from the firm. Since the sale of G to the L type is profitable for
the firm, it must be the case that a self enforcing deviation will involve the
firm continuing to offer G. Hence the firm must offer some additional trade,
M, say which is requested by the H type, and this must generate higher
expected profit for the firm than trading G with the H type. Moreover, the H
type must also be better off at M than at G. No such trade M can exist, since
G is a point of full insurance.
A symmetric argument establishes that a subcoalition of the firm and the
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L types cannot also find a self - enforcing deviation to undermine the original
deviation. So the original deviating agreement is self -enforc ing , establishing
that (P,v) is not self enforcing.
STEP 3 : There cannot be a self enforcing agreement ( P , v) resulting in a
separating allocation where the H types obtain higher expected util i ty than at
If this were false, the trade obtained by the H type would earn losses
for the firm trading with it (since by assumption the L types obtain a
different trade) , and this firm would be better off dropping the offer of this
trade.
STEP 4 : There cannot be a self enforcing agreement ( P , v) resulting in a
pooled allocation.
Consider first the possibility that (P,v) results in both types obtaining
the trade C = x Then a coalition of an inactive firm and the L types could
H
deviate to an agreement to trade a point such as J in Figure 2. This is
evidently a credible deviation which is self enforcing and undermines (P,v).
Using the result of Step 2, a pooling allocation resulting from a self
enforcing (P,v) must therefore lose money on the H types. The firm of ferine
the trade must break even, and must therefore be earning positive prori- irom
the L types. (P,v) would then be undermined by a self -cniorcing aeviation
involving the firm and the L type (for example as towards the end of the
reasoning in Step 1)
.
STEP 5 : Every agreement (P . v) that is self enforcing must result in the
non-cross- subsidized separating allocation .
By Step 4, a self enforcing agreement (P,v) must result in a separating
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allocation. By Steps 2 and 3, and the fact that the trade offered to the H
type must break even, all such agreements must result in the H type obtaining
a trade of C = x The trade obtained by the L type must also earn nonnegative
expected profit, and allow the L type at least as much expected utility as C.
Moreover, the H type must also not envy the trade obtained by the L type. Now
note that the trade D - x maximizes the expected utility of the L type
subject to the constraint that the resulting allocation (i.e. combined with C
for the H type) is incentive compatible, and that the trade earns nonnegative
expected profit. If the L type receives a trade with a lower expected utility,
he can form a coalition with an inactive firm and deviate to an agreement to
trade a point in the neighborhood of D which earns positive expected profit,
generates a higher utility for the L type, and is not envied by the H type.
This agreement would be good and would undermine (P,v). Hence every self
enforcing (P,v) would result in the allocation (x x ) . Q.E.D.
H L
Self enforcing agreements do not permit the use of cross-subsidized
contracts, for the reason that such contracts are vulnerable to
"crearaskimming , " i.e. an inactive firm can offer a contract which attracts
away only the low risk customers. This is quite similar to the way a pooling
allocation is not sustainable in the Rothschi Id-
S
tigli tz analysis. In a cross
subsidized separating allocation has the additional problem that the firiTi
offering the trade to the high risk customers will be better off withdrawing
this trade.
In contrast, the IC Core approach of Boyd, Prescott and Smith (1988) and
Marimon (1988) allow cross subsidized allocations to be viable. This is the
crucial distinction between the two approaches. For instance, Marimon requires
every deviating proposal to respect "property rights" of the complementary
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coalition, which has the effect of ruling out creamskimming deviations (since
Che original firm left selling to the high risk customers alone would suffer
losses as a result of the deviation). Boyd, Prescott and Smith require the
deviating proposal to satisfy the property that members of the complementary
coalition should not prefer to join the deviating coalition: this also has the
effect of prohibiting creamskimming. The IC Core approach thus pertains to a
context where all deviating proposals are publicly observable, in contrast to
our approach which presumes that deviations occur privately. The distinction
may be thought of as corresponding to two different trading environments, with
the IC Core relevant to a centralized framework with a richer structure of
public information. Our approach pertains instead to a decentralized trading
arrangement, the hallmark of which is that contracts between a set of
individuals are unobservable to others.
Despite the possibility of creamskimming, our analysis does not suffer
from problems of nonexistence akin to the Rothschild Stiglitz analysis. This
is where the consistency of the solution concept is essential. While any
pooled contract can be undermined by a separating contract, a separating
contract cannot be undermined by a pooled contract (since the latter is itself
non-viable) . Since an undermining agreement is required to be a good
agreement, players are credited with a certain aeeree of foresight. Ir is this
feature of our solution concent that make.'; :r similar to the '-oncept of
Reactive Equilibrium introduced by Riley (1979).
20
IV WELFARE IMPLICATIONS
It is well known chat the separating allocation without cross subsidy is
constrained inefficient if the proportion of high risk customers in the
population is low (see Rothschild-Stiglitz (1976, pp 644-5) or Crocker and
Snow (1985)). For instance, in cases where there is no Nash Equilibrium in the
Rothschild-Stiglitz model, this allocation is Pareto dominated by any pooling
contract that breaks it. It pays low risk customers to offer to subsidize high
risk customers if that relaxes the incentive constraint for the latter
sufficiently to relax the constraint on the quantum of insurance available to
the low risk customers. If the proportion of high risk customers is small, the
per capita cost of a given subsidy for any given low risk customer is small,
and a Pareto improvement results.
As demonstrated in the previous section, a market outcome is not
consistent with cross subsidization, since such arrangements are vulnerable to
creamskimming. Inefficiency thus results from the decentralized character of
the contracting process. This may be alternatively interpreted as a problem
of insufficient commitment abilities on the part of market agents. This
problem appears to be peculiar to adverse selection environments: with a
similar model of contracting in a moral hazard insurance environment.
Coalition Proof Equilibrium outcomes correspond exactly to the set cf
constrained efficient outcomes (see Kahn and Mookherjee (1990b)).
What specific policies may the government adopt in order to effect
welfare improvements? A natural candidate is the public provision of
cross-subsidized or pooled insurance. It may appear that such schemes are also
vulnerable to creamskimming: private firms may have an incentive to make
profits by weaning away the low risk customers from the public pool. This
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problem, however, does noc arise if public insurance is provided universally
and corapulsorily , i.e. low risk customers do not have the freedom to opt out
of the public insurance program (by paying lower taxes). In particular, note
that it is feasible for the government to implement the pooled insurance
program (point B in Figure 1) which breaks even for the population as a whole,
and provides each customer with full insurance (assuming the absence of moral
hazard) . This has the effect of shifting the initial endowment of all
customers to a point where all gains from trade between customers and private
firms are exhausted. Such an outcome is always constrained efficient: indeed
it is efficient in a first best environment, and it Pareto dominates the CPEPI
outcome whenever the latter is constrained inefficient.
It is the assumed superior ability of the government to commit that
accounts for its potential welfare role in the previous analysis. A private
firm would not be able to credibly replicate the policy of providing the
pooled full insurance policy that breaks even because of its inabilility to
commit to continue providing this policy: it will have a temptation to drop
its high risk customers to increase its profits. The government's superior
ability to commit may stem from the different nature of its objectives:
concern for welfare or reelection prospects may cause it to be more sensitive
to the comprehensiveness of public insurance programs mar. re the
profitability of such programs. A more explicit analysis ot commitment
possibilities, however, is a task for future research.
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FOOTNOTES
An early interpretation of equilibrium arrangements with private information
as nonmarket organizations is provided by Miyazaki (1977). Boyd, Prescott and
Smith (1988) develop this theme in particular. Other cooperative analyses of
private information economies include Boyd and Prescott (1986), Kahn (1987),
Marimon (1988), and Berliant (1990).
2
See however, Yannelis (1991), Krasa-Yannelis (1991) and Allen (1991) for
extensions of the value to private information contexts. Chakravorti -Kahn
(1990) consider an extension related to the bargaining set. Lacker and
Weinberg (1990) consider an IC-Core extension which imposes the same
consistency requirements on blocking and equilibrium allocations.
3
To the extent that we assume that nondeviants cannot react to any given
deviation, this may appear surprising. One would expect that we would continue
to be plagued by the nonexistence of equilibrium as did Rothschild and
Stiglitz. However, we do obtain existence of equilibrium by insisting on
consistency of the solution concept, i.e. that deviating proposals be subject
to similar restrictions as are proposed equilibria. Since cross-subsidized
contracts are not viable themselves, they cannot be used to block
non-cross-subsidized separating allocations. In this manner the
Rothschild-Stiglitz nonexistence problem disappears. Morever, agents proposing
a deviating contract must 'look ahead' and check whether this contract can be
rendered unprofitable by a further deviation, before considering it seriously.
For this reason, we end up with a solution concept that resembles the Reactive
equilibrium notion.
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4
Recall that constrained efficient allocations often involve
cross - subsidization. The solutions generated by our model may therefore fail
to be constrained efficient.
We describe the model with a finite set of player categories and types for
simplicity. In some contexts an infinity of player categories may be
necessary, as in the free-entry application of Kahn-Mookherj ee (1990b). In
this case the stable sets approach can be used to generalize the equilibrium
concept; see Kahn-Mookherj ee (1990a).
Even this limitation is not absolute: for applications in which individuals
who are of identical categories have effects on one another, the game can
be modified by replicating the set of categories.
We abuse notation by using W.(s|t.) to denote the expected payoff of type t.
at the strategy vector s. In terras of expression (2.1) for expected payoffs,
we have W.(s|t.) =- W.(s .,s.(t.)|t.).11 1-1111
The standard formulation of Coalition Proof Equilibrium (BPW (1987),
Greenberg (1989), Kahn-Mookherj ee (1990a)) specifies weak rather than strict
inclusion. Kahn-Mookherj ee (1990a) show the advantages of this alternate
formulation in general; in the context examined here the rssultc are
equivalent but it simplifies the presentation.
9
Strictly speaking, they will need to assure themselves that the actual
coalition does not contain any type that is not supposed to be part of it.
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10
It IS important to remember that excluded types are actually unaware of the
deviation. Condition (2.3) deals with a counterfactual essential to make the
deviation credible: included types convince each other of their identities
by demonstrating that they couldn't possibly benefit from the new agreement if
they were actually of a different, unrepresented, type.
Kahn and Mookherjee (1990a) show that the stable set approach gives the
better generalization of CPE in more complicated contexts. In general, a
stable partition may not exist; in such situations the notion of a stable
partition has to be extended to a semi-stable partition. That paper also
deals with extensions when there are multiple stable sets.
12
This follows from the fact that any deviation by a singleton coalition is
always credible, since different types of the same player do not interact with
one another, and a deviation by any one type therefore does not affect the
payoffs of other types (so that (2.3) is always satisfied for any such
deviation)
.
13^ .
F IS at least 3.
14
Thus customers are constrained to trade exclusively with a single firm. This
is a significant restriction, because customers will typicallv have a--
incentive to trade with multiple firms. For a discussion of this issue, see
Pauly (1974), Jaynes (1978) and Kahn and Mookherjee (1991). Nevertheless, most
models of insurance markets assume that information about trades between any
set of agents is publicly observable, so exclusive contracts are feasible.
Morever, it is evident that any firm trading with any customer will always
(weakly) prefer to be the exclusive provider. Thus if the technology exists
to enforce exclusive trades, the insurers will make sure it is adopted.
27
Boyd, Prescotc and Smith do not model firms explicitly: the above comment
pertains to the obvious extension of their model with firms as explicit
players.
One difference between the Reactive Equilibrium and our solution concept
ought to be noted: in the former, a firm offering a contract foresees the
reactions of ocher firms, while in the latter it can also foresee its own
temptation to deviate away from the contract. In this respect, our notion also
captures a criterion of renegotiation proofness.
17^
-
•
. . , . u -^- •In practice, group insurance practices involving cross subsidization are
commonly observed. Nevertheless, it is unclear to what extent this reflects
purely voluntary behavior: for instance, employer-provided insurance is
bundled with other attributes of an employment contract.
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